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RECENT C4SE NOTES
court says, "Therefore, when an agent or employee has authority to sell or
otherwise dispose of property and does sell or otherwise dispose of it, not for
the purpose authorized but with fraudulent intent to appropriate it or its
proceeds to his own use, he is guilty of embezzling the property itself as much
as if he had no authority to sell or otherwise dispose of it, for the sale or
disposition of the property with said fraudulent intent is a conversion." 2 4
The importance of this decision lies in the fact that, so far as this writer has
been able to learn, this is the first instance in which a fraudulent appropria-
tion in the civil sense has been held sufficient for fraudulent appropriation in
the criminal sense. This takes on added significance when we remember that
this was a case where fraudulent criminal intent was not directly proved but
had to be inferred from the act. It seems that the court has taken another
step in the direction of merging criminal prosecutions under express statutory
definitions with common law doctrines imposing civil liability. The high
degree of care and good faith in managing trust estates has thus taken on a
wider import by its application to criminal liability.2 5  D. C.
DAMAGES-LIQUIDATED DAMAGES-PENALTY.-Plaintiff sued defendant to
recover liquidated damages for defendant buyer's breach of a contract to
purchase certain brands of flour manufactured by plaintiff seller, The con-
tract provided for liquidated damages in case of buyer's failure to furnish
shipping instructions, on the basis of % cent per day per barrel of flour from
date of sale to date of termination as expense of carrying, plus twenty cents
per barrel as cost of selling, plus or minus the amount or the difference
between the market value at date of sale and the market value at date of
termination of the amount of wheat necessary to manufacture the number of
barrels of flour undelivered. Defendant contends that the contract provision
for liquidated damages is invalid as the measure of damages in Indiana for
breach of contract for sale of goods is the difference between the contract price
and the market price at the date of breach. Held, the contract provisions for
liquidated damages were valid and the damages assessed were not excessive. 1
Damages, as that term is used in the law of contracts, is intended com-
pensation for a breach, measured in the terms of the contract. Damages are
awarded by a jury, by the court in applying the rules of damages, or by the
parties to a contract when they liquidate the damages by attempting in
advance to estimate in good faith the actual damage which will probably
flow from the breach.
Liquidated damages have not been permitted by the courts when they
had the characteristics of a penalty rather than a bona-fide attempt by the
parties to estimate their probable injury. As a general rule the intent of the
parties is controlling as to whether a provision is for liquidated damages
or is a penalty,2 but the courts are not bound by the name given to the
agreement by the parties in determining the character of the sum payable on
24 (1911), 176 Ind. 234, 247, 94- N. E. 819, 824.
25 26 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 289.
1 Letellier et al. v. Abilene Flour Mills Co. (1935), 198 N. E. 111.
2 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1907), 205 U. S. 105.
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default.8 The agreement will be construed with respect to the circumstances
surrounding the contract, the ease or difficulty of measuring the damages, and
whether the sum named is out of proportion to the actual damages resulting
from the breach. 4 "The question must be determined in a great measure
from the facts as they arise in each particular case," the court stated in
the instant case, and it quoted from Dowd v. Andrews5 that "when the nature
of the contract is such that upon a breach thereof the resulting damages will
be uncertain and difficult of proof, and the amount of damages fixed by the
parties is not greatly disproportionate to the loss likely to be occasioned by the
breach, the same will be treated as liquidated damages."
When the court, by properly construing the agreement so as to determine
the intent of the parties as to what result it was intended to accomplish, finds
that the provision provided for liquidated damages rather than a penalty,
such provision will be recognized as valid and enforced, according to the
weight and trend of modern authority.6 Indiana recognizes the validity of
contracts providing for liquidated damages, stating in Mondamin Dairy Co. v.
Brudi 7 that "The rule generally affirmed by the authorities is that, where it is
agreed by the parties that the sum or rate fixed in a contract shall be liquidated
damages, and the case is one in which they are at liberty to so agree, such an
agreement must stand and control, unless it is inconsistent with other parts
of the contract, or is unreasonable or unconscionable, in view of the probable
damages which may flow from a breach of said contract."
At one time the courts almost universally construed liquidated damages
provisions in contracts as penalties and would seldom admit that such clauses
were valid. The modern tendency, however, is to construe these provisions
liberally and allow the parties to make their own contracts so long as they
stay within the bounds of reasonableness.0 The courts have taken the position
that where damages are not readily ascertainable or susceptible of proof It is
highly equitable for the parties to determine as nearly as possible the amount
which will compensate the injured party.
Two reasons have been advanced for this change of position. One is that
as business men are constantly striving towards certainty and security of
position they should be permitted to make definite provisions in their contracts
as to what results will follow if a breach occurs. If this privilege is denied, it
is reasoned, many contracts would be made and enforced which would not
have been entered into by the parties in the absence of such certainty of position
8 Weiss v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty (1921), 300 Ill. 11, 132 N. E. 749;
Dowd v. Andrews (1922), 77 Ind. App. 627, 134 N. E. 294, Davis v. Freeman
(1862), 10 Mich. 188, Greenblatt v. McCall & Co. (1914), 67 Ala. 165,
64 So. 748.
4 In re McGreary (1884), 31 Pitts. Leg. Jrnl. (Pa.), 317, J. I. Case
Threshing Machine Co. v. Fronk (1908), 105 Minn. 39, 117 N. W 229.
5 (1922), 77 Ind. App. 627, 134 N. E. 294.
6 Sun Printing & Publishing Assn. v. Moore (1902), 183 U. S. 642; U. S.
v. United Engineering & Contracting Co. (1914), 234 U. S. 236, Wise v.
U. S. (1919), 249 U. S. 361.
7 (1904), 165 Ind. 642, 72 N. E. 643.
STayloe v. Sandiford (1822), 7 Wheat. 13, Davis v. Gillett (1872), 52
N. H. 126, Wallis v. Carpenter (1866), 95 Mass. 19; 53 L. .. A. 122;
Sedgwick on Damages, 9th ed., sec. 392.
9 U. S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1907), 205 U. S. 105, Quaile v. Kelley
Milling Co. (1931), 184 Ark. 717, 47 S. W (2nd) 369.
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as is afforded by a provision for liquidated damages. "In the complexities of
modern business, breaches of contract involve more incidental but real damages
than when business was less complicated. In later years business men
have been more desirous of contracting as to damages in order that their
liability may be a known rather than an unknown quantity."1o The modern
industrial machine with its large plant overhead and mass production equip-
ment, geared to a specific demand, is a delicate organism and its workings are
easily upset. The courts apparently now seek to protect it against the dangers
of uncertainty by allowing its managers to hedge their position with contract
provisions. There has been no indication, however, that the courts intend to
allow a contracting party to take advantage of this tendency towards liberality
of construction and permit enforcement of unfair or unreasonable provisions for
liquidated damages.1 1 Such provisions continue to be regarded with disfavor
by the courts.
The other reason advanced for the shift of attitude is that the courts are
encouraging the tendency away from litigatson, which tendency benefits both
the courts in relieving them from crowded calendars, and the parties to the
agreement in relieving them of the expenses and delay necessarily incident to
law suits. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin illustrated the modern tendency
by its statement in Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Jacobs12 that "The removal
of managers from the business of a large, highly organized concern
during the time necessarily consumed in a trial entails an expense, in excess
of recoverable costs, so great as to prevent in many cases any reimbursement
to a manufacturer. Modern business is so managed as to avoid litigation-
a tendency which should be encouraged in all fair and legitimate ways because
it is conducive to the general welfare."
The instant case indicates that the Indiana courts are following the modern
tendency to construe these provisions liberally. The liquidated damages pro-
visions of the contract under consideration differed from the established rules
of damages used by the courts in that: (1) the damages were not measured
in terms of the price of flour, the subject matter of the contract, but by the
price of wheat, the raw material from which this commodity was made;
(2) the amount of damages was determined by finding the difference between
the price of wheat on the date of the contract and its price on the date of
breach, the usual rule of determining the damages by finding the difference at
the date of breach between the market price at place of delivery and the con-
tract price being waived by the court in favor of the contract provisions.
M. E. W
CONTRACTS--OFFER AND AccEPTANcE-LAPSE OF OFFER.-By the case as
reported, defendant sponsored and conducted a racing stake for horses. Entries
were to be permitted according to rules contained in a printed nomination
blank used for that purpose. Among the entrance requirements necessary was
one providing that entry fees were to be paid by May 1. Plaintiff was the
owner of two horses and wishing to enter them sent in the amount required
10 Quaile v. Kelley Milling Co., supra.
11 Kothe, Trustee, v. R. C. Taylor Trust (1930), 280 U. S. 224.
12 (1920), 170 Wis. 389, 175 N. W 796.
